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‘In truth, the “right to strike” in the UK depends for its realisation on a complex 
statutory scheme. Even in jurisdictions where the right to strike is specified 
textually in a constitutional document, such a complex right must be 
operationalised through labour statutes. It is a classic instance of a 
“legislated” right. Since the enactment of the Human Rights Act, and the 
evolving jurisprudence of the ECtHR, UK law may now be described as 
protecting a right to strike albeit one that is pieced together from a variety of 
sources: statutes such as TULRCA, the common law, Convention rights, and 
relevant case law.’1  
Does this statement accurately encapsulate the UK law on the ‘right to strike’? 
How do the different sources of law interact and what factors determine the 
correct balance to be reached between competing interests in regulating 
industrial action? Use case law, statute, legal commentary and social science 
material in your answer and provide illustrations to support your analysis.  
In line with socialism and Professor Beverly Silver’s assertions, capitalism is 
established upon ‘two contradictory tendencies’: ‘crises of profitability and crises of 
social legitimacy’.2 This ‘inherent labour-capital’3 struggle is reflected within the UK’s 
hostile regulation of industrial action. The courts’ and legislature’s ideological 
approaches towards the collective right to withdraw labour unanimously and 
substantially favours economic growth above social welfare.4  
Striking, overtime bans, and refusing to carry out certain tasks are collective forms of 
actions that can arise from workplace disputes.5 These disputes typically occur 
because employers are unwilling to negotiate with employees and workers about 
their working terms or conditions. Undeniably, the duration – and the aftermath – of 
the collective action results in financial losses to the business and affect innocent 
third parties (i.e. the general public).6 Therefore, in order to appease and ‘bring the 
labour under control’, the capital would ‘have to make concessions [i.e. comply with 
the strikers’ new terms], which provoke crises of profitability’.7 However, the loss 
suffered by a business8 during and after industrial action is justified on two 
persuasive grounds. The first ground identified by Gwyneth Pitt is the human right 
aspect.9 To restrict the right to strike would be akin to the horrific period of slavery,10 
where man had no power to withdraw his labour. This justification is recognising the 
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inequalities in bargaining power between employer and employee.11 This inequality 
has been further escalated by the growth of the modern-day unstable gig economy; 
one in nine UK workers are in precarious work.12 This form of work has limited 
protection and much lower salaries.13 Hence, a subsequent ground for the 
justification of withdrawal of labour is the equilibrium argument. The power of the 
employer and their actions can only be matched and questioned by a ‘concerted 
stoppage of work’.14 Essentially, the right to strike is more than the withdrawal of 
labour: it is also the encompassing ‘right to free expression, association, assembly 
and power’.15 Yet there is ‘no positive legal right to strike in the UK’.16  
Instead, ‘the “right to strike” in the UK depends for its realisation on a complex 
statutory scheme’.17 In contrast to its neighbouring European countries’ (Spain and 
Italy) jurisdictions ‘where the right to strike is specified textually in a constitutional 
document’, the UK law ‘protects a right to strike … from a variety of sources: statutes 
such as TULRCA, the common law, Convention rights, and relevant case law’.18 The 
accuracy of Bogg and Dukes’ encapsulation of the UK law on the ‘right to strike’ and 
how the different sources of law interact will be subsequently discussed. 
 
i. Common Law 
Judiciary  
While Spain19 and Italy20 protect the right to strike by suspending the contract of 
employment during industrial action, this contract is broken under English law.21 This 
is because the English common law does not confer a right to strike,22 hence ‘the 
rigour of the common law applies in the form of a breach of contract on part of the 
strikers and economic torts … [for] the organisers and their union’.23  
It is tortious and indefensible24 to induce an individual to breach their contract of 
employment.25 This principle was established in Lumley v Gye,26 and this liability 
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Times, 20 January 2020) <www.ft.com/content/576c68ea-3784-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4> accessed 
16 December 2020 
13 Employment Rights Act 1996, s212. 
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15 Brian Smart, ‘The Right to Strike and The Right to Work’ (1985) 2 Journal of Applied Philosophy 31. 
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extends to trade unions in the context of industrial action.27 Additionally, there are 
two further economic torts trade unions can be held liable for: liability for conspiracy 
to injure (Quinn v Leathem)28 and causing loss by unlawful means. Until OBG Ltd v 
Allan, Douglas, and others v Hello! Ltd,29 the ‘tort of procuring a breach of contract 
had been [“blurred”30 and] extended [to be a wider] tort of unlawful interference with 
contractual relations’.31 These torts were later distinguished and separated in the 
House of Lord’s (HoL) judgment of OBG v Allan. 
While it is not often, the courts are encouraged to distinguish and introduce new 
torts. The HoL in OBG v Allan subsequently outlined the distinguishing elements 
between unlawful means and the tort of procuring a breach of contract. The tort of 
procuring a breach of contract is an accessory liability. Whilst the tort of unlawful 
means is a ‘primary liability that is not dependent on the third party having committed 
a wrong against the claimant’.32 Yet, despite the tort differences, the HoL confirmed 
that the same act could give rise to liability under both unlawful interference and 
procuring a breach of contract.33 This clarification and the development of unlawful 
interferences as a separate liability has notably accommodated employers in holding 
trade unions liable for more than one tort.  
The OBG v Allan judgment is significant for discussing industrial action for two 
notable reasons. The first is that it confirms the judiciary’s ‘uncontrolled power’34 in 
developing and ‘defining torts boundaries on a case-to-case basis.35 This power is 
‘ensur[ing] that trade unions cannot provide a lawful excuse or justification for their 
actions’36; trade unions are ultimately ‘stood naked and unprotected at the altar of 
the common law’.37 The insufficiency of protection for trade unions under the 
common law exhibits the judiciary’s biased and hostile ideology towards industrial 
action.38 This subsequently aligns with the following observation: the courts favour 
economic profits. This is discerned by the extent to which the contemporary judiciary 
extends protection for commercial bodies.39 The primary function of English tort law 
was to protect physical integrity and property rights; tort law was never concerned 
with the protection of economic interests.40 Nor had the common law ever been 
historically exercised to ‘legitimately control aspects of the economy’41 and yet OBG 
v Allan demonstrates the extent to which this has now changed. The judiciary has 
extensively and needlessly stretched the common law and its torts42 to protect 
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849. 
35 Lonrho v Fayed [1990] 2 QB 479, 492-93. 
36 Collins, McColgan, and Ewing (n 5), 714. 
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‘already powerful organisations’.43 Hence, from the perspective of trade unions and 
their members, the common law’s (inadequate) protection for the ‘right to strike’ has 
been, undeniably, very disappointing.  
 
II. Statutes  
Legislature 
One of the major problems facing trade unions was the ‘exposure of their funds to 
legal action by employers’44; in 1901, Taff Vale Railway Co successfully sued the 
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants union for £42,000.45 This sum is 
equivalent to £5,196,328.39 today. This verdict, in effect, eliminated ‘the strike as a 
weapon of organized labour’.46 Naturally, workers turned to political parties for 
redress. The concern and advocacy for trade union reform accounted for 59% of the 
winning Liberal party’s election manifesto.47 The Liberal government, led by Prime 
Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman, provided unions with wide immunity against 
any tortious liability arising from trade disputes under The Trade Disputes Act (TDA) 
1906. Although this Act did not introduce a ‘legislated right’ for industrial action,48 this 
statute effectively recognised the vulnerability of unions under the common law by 
‘secur[ing] a [statutory] freedom’ instead. 49 The TDA is one of the 
‘most important pieces of labour legislation ever passed by a British Parliament’50; it 
effectively ‘kept the courts at a minimum’51 and neutralised the most obvious adverse 
effects of the Taff Vale judgment. The ‘sympathetic politicians’ were ‘periodically 
reconstructing’ the role of the ‘class-conscious’, profit-favouring judiciary.52 The 
outcome of the 1906 general election ‘served the unions’ interests well’53 and it 
continued to for 65 years. 
The ‘long enjoyed’54 immunity of trade unions for liability in tort was reduced to partial 
immunity under the Thatcher government (1979-90). There is a ‘scale of government 
ideology’ which ranges from ‘fully participative’ to ‘fully authoritative’,55 and the 
Thatcher government was the undoubtable latter. The Conservative ideology and 
economists, such as FA Hayek, viewed trade unions as an obstacle to economic 
growth.56 This perception was heightened by the Winter of Discontent (1978-79): a 
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47 Kidner (n 44), 47. 
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period characterised by widespread of strikes in response to the Labour 
government’s wage cap (to maintain falling inflation).57 Subsequently, Thatcher’s 
government further justified the re-introduction of liability for trade unions upon the 
succeeding Green Papers: the 1981 Trade Union Immunities58 and the 1989 Trade 
Unions and their Members.59 Both papers outlined concerns regarding democracy, 
rights, and freedom of trade union members; ‘too often in recent years it has seemed 
that employees have been called out on strike by their unions without proper 
consultation and sometimes against their express wishes’.60 Accordingly, the 
Thatcher government introduced legislation that prior Conservative governments 
were afeard of passing: the Employment Act 1980, Trade Union Act 1984, and Trade 
Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993. These re-introduced vulnerability 
and high costs for unions. Under the Employment Rights Act 1980, ‘trade-dispute’ 
was re-defined, statutory liabilities were introduced and unions were exposed to 
injunctions and claims for damages. However, upon complying with the stringent 
balloting requirements (from secret ballot to the requirement for all ballots to be 
postal) in the 1984 and 1993 Acts, the dispute would be deemed lawful.61 It is 
expensive for unions to comply and evidence the fulfilled balloting requirements, but 
if lawful union members are statutorily protected from unfair dismissals and 
injunctions.62 While this is a brief summary of the Acts, these restrictive measures 
offer an insight into the Thatcher government’s success in exercising its agenda of 
restricting the lawfulness of industrial action by limiting its previously protected scope 
and purposes. 
Subsequently, the process of placing further controls on trade unions continued into 
the 21st century.63 The 2015 Conservative government introduced the ‘draconian’64 
Trade Union Act 2016 (TUA) – the most significant union legislation since the 
Employment Act 1980. The TUA introduced a minimum threshold of eligible 
members to vote in the ballot (at least 50% turnout and 50% voting in favour).65 
Moreover, in the instance the members are engaged in ‘important public services’,66 
40% of all members entitled to vote must have voted in support of the industrial 
action. These stringent procedural requirements have to be strictly followed for a 
strike to be lawful.67 Oddly, there was no pressing need to introduce these restrictive 
measures.68 There were no significant problems in industrial relations at the time (ie, 
Winter of Discontent) nor any significant ‘pressure from business for further laws on 
strikes’,69 but the Conservative government justified these 2016 measures through 
 
57 Alex Kitson, ‘1978-1979: Winter of Discontent’ (Libcom.org, 24 January 2007) 
<http://libcom.org/history/1978-1979-winter-of-discontent> accessed 11 December 2020. 
58 Cmd, 8128, 1981. 
59 Cmd 821, 1989. 
60 Trade Union Immunities (n 58), para 247. 
61 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993, s238A. 
62 TULRCA 1992, ss237-38. 
63 Michael Ford and Tonia Novitz, ‘Legislating for Control: The Trade Union Act 2016’ (2020) 45 ILJ 
227. 
64 Bart Cammaerts, ‘The Efforts to Restrict the Freedom to Strike and To Deny A Right to Strike 
Should Be Resisted Fiercely’ (LSE Blogs, 14 September 2015) 
<https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-efforts-to-restrict-the-freedom-to-strike-and-to-deny-a-
right-to-strike-should-be-resisted-fiercely/> accessed 11 December 2020. 
65 TUA 2016, s226(2)(a) (ii). 
66 ibid, s226(2)(e). 
67 ibid, s238A. 
68 Ford and Novitz (n 63), 291. 
69 ibid, 291. 
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the findings of Bruce Carr QC and Ed Holmes.70 The Government submitted the Carr 
Review to indicate a consistent pattern of union bullying workers, and yet Carr 
himself ‘did not contend his findings to be a sufficient basis’ for influencing the 
TUA.71 Instead, the true motivations behind the government’s 2016 legislative 
programme are observed by the ‘striking resemblance’72 to Ed Holmes Modernising 
Industrial Relations (MIR) paper.73 The policy paper daringly questioned the 
necessity of protecting industrial action by reflecting on the development of 
employment tribunals and discussing the economic consequences of strikes. The 
same ‘free-market economic theory’ that underpinned the MIR’s recommendations 
‘drove’ the pragmatically restrictive and economically influenced 2016 statute 
developments.74 
The substance of today’s statute in protecting trade unions ‘is far removed and much 
weaker than the position established in 1906’.75 Since the Henry Campbell-
Bannerman leadership, trade union membership has declined by more than half due 
to the ‘three successive Conservative governments [who] have enacted labour 
legislation opposed by unions’.76 It appears the deep-rooted ideology of the political 
party in power influences the legislative steps for protecting trade unions.77 
Therefore, the extent of the Conservative government’s ‘authoritarian, class-biased 
and oppressive’78 industrial action policies will be exemplified and ‘more evident than 
they are today when a Labour government is elected again’.79 
 
Judiciary 
While the likes of Maurice Kay LJ and Lord Neuberger MR ‘characterised the 
statutory immunities as limited exceptions to the common law’ to justify interpreting 
the statute provisions ‘strictly against the trade union’, the court’s overall response to 
industrial action ‘has been more mixed’.80 The court in Merkur Island Shipping v 
Laughton81 developed a three-part test to examine the legality of industrial action. 
This test encapsulates the substantive and procedural requirements for a lawful 
strike whilst observing the intertwined and ‘uneasy’ relationship between the 
common law and statute.82 If the industrial action is unlawful at common law, the 
judiciary asks whether there is a ‘prime facie statutory immunity’ for the commission 
of torts.83 This substantive question considers whether the action was ‘in 
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute’84 before questioning whether the 
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immunity had been procedurally lost by one of the three specified statutory reasons 
in TULRCA 1992.85 The union’s partial immunity could be lost for minor 
‘inconsequential breaches of the statutory rules’86; there is a series of High Court 
instances of injunctions being granted to ‘ever more powerful and well-resourced 
employers’87 owing to invalid strike ballots.88 The readily available labour injunctions 
continued to be the “key piece89” of suppressing collective action until the minor 
development in 2011.  
In RMT v Serco Ltd; ASLEF v London and Birmingham Railway Limited (RMT and 
ASLEF),90 the Court of Appeal approved and applied Millett LJ’s 1996 observation in 
London Underground Limited v National Union of Railwaymen, Maritime and 
Transport Staff:91 ‘the democratic requirement of a secret ballot is not to make life 
more difficult for trade unions … but for the protection of the Union’s own 
members’.92 Owing to this proposed democratic aim, the court in RMT and ASLEF 
confirmed it was ‘to interpret the statutory provisions somewhat less stringently’.93 
This interpretation is a stark contrast to Maurice Kay LJ’s understanding of 
parliament’s intentions. The court furthered Millett LJ’s aim by recommending a 
neutral, ‘without presumptions one way or the other’,94 interpretation of TULRCA. 
Upon the fact TULRCA is premised on the existing common law framework, the 
court’s ‘judicial creativity’ could have easily ‘outflank[ed] the intentions of 
Parliament’.95 Instead of a ‘neutral’ approach, the courts have the power to mitigate 
unions disproportionate vulnerability against injunctions, damages, and unfair 
dismissals by encouraging and favouring social legitimacy. Although, the RMT and 
ASLEF court ‘only indicated a change in emphasis rather than substance’96 (since 
unions are still burdened with the challenges of exercising a ‘lawful’ strike),97 this 
judgment enhanced union’s ability to resist injunction applications (as observed by 
Balfour Beatty Engineering Services Limited v Unite the Union).98 The unbiased 
interpretation encouraged in RMT and ASLEF continues to be the leading approach 
to interpreting domestic statutes regarding industrial action.   
 
III. ECHR  
Judiciary  
 
85 ibid, ss222, 224, and 226.  
86 Dukes (n 80), 309. 
87 Kalina Arabadjieva, ‘Royal Mail Group Ltd v Communication Workers Union (CWU): Injunctions 
Preventing Industrial Action and The Right to Strike’ (UK Labour Law, 6 March 2020) 
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injunctions-preventing-industrial-action-and-the-right-to-strike-by-kalina-arabadjieva/> accessed 12 
December 2020. 
88 TULRCA 1992, s226. 
89 Arabadjieva (n 87). 
90 n 22. 
91 [1996] ICR 170. 
92 ibid, [180]-[182]. 
93 Dukes (n 82), 309. 
94 RMT and ASLEF (n 22), [2]. 
95 Smith (n 4). 
96 Ford and Novitz (n 63), 281. 
97 Arabadjieva (n 87). 
98 [2012] EWHC 267 (QB). 
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Admittedly, the scope of Maurice Kay LJ’s strict interpretation was narrowly limited 
by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).99 The ECtHR confirmed, in Enerji 
Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey,100 that Article 11 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights included protection of the right to strike. This Article, and Article 6 of the 
European Social Charter101 bestow the right to strike for their member states 
members and due to the UK Human Rights Act 1998, ‘British workers are 
understood to enjoy a right to strike’.102 This, unlike the mere domestic statutory 
immunities, is the only instance of a ‘legislated’ right to strike in the UK.103  
Under section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, ‘statutory provisions must be read 
and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights’104 – ‘the 
opportunity to test this line of argument’105 in the English courts arose in Metrobus 
Ltd v Unite the Union (Metrobus).106 The Court of Appeal rejected the Enerji 
arguments; the Court denied the authority’s relevance for the interpretation of UK 
statutory provisions. This judgment continues to be the leading precedent on the 
UK’s provisions of Article 11,107 despite the RMT and ASLEF judgment. In RMT and 
ASLEF, the UK courts acknowledged the ‘clearly protected’108 right to strike under 
ECHR Article 11. However, the court emphasised the importance of a ‘fair balance to 
be struck between the competing interests of the individual and the community as a 
whole’.109 The emphasised interests of the ‘community’ motivated the court’s 
justification for the ban on secondary action owing to its ‘potential to … cause broad 
disruption within the economy and to affect the delivery of services to the public’.110 
Subsequently, the court confirmed that this ban aligns with Article 11(2) ‘on the basis 
of a wide margin of appreciation accorded to the State’.111  While the court is correct 
to recognise their bestowed margin of appreciation, the court rationalised the 
granting of the injunction, ‘which itself cost the union a substantial sum’,112 upon 
economic factors. This factor is not only ‘wholly irrelevant to the specific facts of the 
application’ but it disregarded and postponed ‘the exercise of what was 
acknowledged to be a convention protected right’.113 The court effectively and 
‘successfully prevented industrial action on the basis of legal’ human rights 
provisions ‘which are intended to benefit workers’.114  
In short, there ‘is no point creating rights’ or passing human rights legislation if the 
‘court is not prepared to defend them’.115 There will continue to be an erosion of 
human rights protection until there is greater coordination between the domestic 
courts and the ECtHR. It is credible to conclude that the UK judiciary is more 
 
99 Keith Ewing and Alan Bogg, ‘The Implications of The RMT Case’ (2014) 40 ILJ 221, 222. 
100 [2009] ECHR 2251. 
101 ‘The right to bargain collectively.’ 
102 Keith Ewing and John Hendy, ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 39 ILJ 2. 
103 Bogg and Dukes (n 1), 478. 
104 ibid. 
105 Dukes (n 82), 303. 
106 n 23. 
107 Dukes (n 82), 310. 
108 Ewing and Bogg (n 99), 221. 
109 RMT and ASLEF (n 22), [77]. 
110 ibid, [82]. 
111 ECHR Art 11 (2).  
112 Ewing and Bogg (n 99), 251. 
113 ibid, 221. 
114 Arabadjieva (n 87). 
115 Ewing and Bogg (n 99), 223. 
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concerned with profitability, self-preservation of UK powers, and ‘in appeasing 
political forces’116 above the interests of the individuals it and the Convention Rights 
was established to serve.  
 
Legislature  
The RMT and ASLEF court’s ‘blessing of a wide margin of appreciation’ in the 
‘encompassment’ of Article 11 offered a ‘green light for further restrictive legislation 
on industrial action’ by the ‘only too happy Government’.117 Here, Boggs and Ewing 
detect ‘the crude politics of power’.118 Upon observing the Court of Appeal’s 
reluctance to exercise EU conventions, and the UK courts’ developments that 
continue to be ‘very much in line with the political approach of the Conservative 
government’,119 it materialises that the court and government are not ‘looking to open 
a third (ECtHR) front’.120  
The Government has recently launched an ‘independent review’ of the Human 
Rights Act.121 The review aims to evaluate ‘the duty to take into account’ ECtHR 
case law and assess ‘whether dialogue between our domestic courts and the ECtHR 
works effectively and if there is room for improvement’.122 It is worth highlighting that 
this ‘independent’ review will be led by former Court of Appeal Judge, Sir Peter 
Gross – the same judge who remarked that ‘the more that controversial areas are 
“outsourced” … the greater the challenge for … judicial leadership’.123 The former 
judge is a notable advocate for greater domestic judicial leadership.124 This 
advocacy hints the likelihood of the review condemning the relevance and 
precedence of the ECtHR (and Human Rights Act 1998) in ‘controversial’ matters 
such as industrial action. This review has the powerful ability to eliminate the only 
instance of a legislated right to strike in the UK.125 
 
Ultimately 
‘The notion of lawful industrial action is restrictive’, the procedural requirements are 
‘onerous’ and the consequences of unions liability for unlawful strikes are 
‘serious’.126 Nearly two decades after the European Social Charter’s review,127 the 
UK still does not guarantee the right to strike. The precedent in Metrobus still stands. 
 
116 ibid, 251. 
117 Ford and Novitz (n 63), 282. 
118 Ewing and Bogg (n 99), 223. 
119 Thomas and Smith (n 77), 737. 
120 Ewing and Bogg (n 99), 223. 
121 Ministry of Justice, ‘Government Launches Independent Review of the Human Rights Act’ (Gov.uk, 
7 December 2020) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-launches-independent-review-
of-the-human-rights-act> accessed 15 December 2020. 
122 ibid. 
123 Jamie Susskind, ‘Jamie Susskind Comments on Sir Peter Gross’ Lecture on Judicial Leadership’ 
(Littleton Chambers) <https://littletonchambers.com/jamie-susskind-comments-on-on-sir-peter-gross-
lecture-on-judicial-leadership/> accessed 15 December 2020. 
124 ibid.  
125 ECHR Art 11. 
126 Ruth Dukes, The Right to Strike Under UK Law: Something More Than A Slogan? Metrobus v 
Unite The Union [2009] EWCA Civ 829’ (2010) 39 ILJ 1, 7. 
127 ESC, Report of the Committee of Experts 2002.  
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There continues to be a ‘poorly reasoned and barely consistent’ series of judgments 
‘by what looks like a weak, timid’128 and politically influenced129 judiciary. The 
enactment of the ‘Human Rights Act and the evolving jurisprudence of the ECtHR’130 
will not prescribe a right to strike in the UK until the Supreme Court or ECtHR rule 
UK’s current provisions as incompatible with Article 11. 
In truth, ‘the right to strike [in the UK] has never been much more than a slogan or a 
legal metaphor’.131 This ‘slogan’ is a regime of immunities that are purposely 
designed upon an overly complex and expensive statutory system.132 These 
immunities are not adequately or proportionately protecting workers, unions, and one 
in nine vulnerable, precarious workers against the ‘pitfalls’133 of damages, 
injunctions, and unfair dismissals.134 This system was successfully underlined with 
the political agenda of deterring trade disputes; the UK’s worker strike total has fallen 
to its ‘lowest level since 1893’.135  The ‘unanimous and hostile’136 approach of the 
legislature and the judiciary towards industrial action exhibits the UK’s covert ‘culture 
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